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AQUINAS AND ARISTOTELIANS ON WHETHER 
THE SOUL IS A GROUP OF POWERS
Nicholas Kahm
In the Aristotelian tradition, there are two broad answers to the basic question “What is soul?” On the one hand, the soul can be described 
by what it does. From this perspective, the soul seems to be composed 
of various different parts or powers (potentiae) that are the principles of 
its various actions. On the other hand, the soul seems to be something 
different, namely, the actual formal principle making embodied living 
substances to be the kinds of things that they are. Contemporary Aris-
totelians are split on how to interpret Aristotle: Anna Marmodoro (2013, 
18), Thomas Johansen (2012, 81), and most others argue that the soul 
is nothing but a kind of cluster or group of powers. Rebekah Johnston 
(2011), however, strongly disagrees and argues that the soul is only the 
actual principle of embodied substance.1 Aquinas provides a novel and 
neglected solution to this problem and would argue that both sides are 
partly right but that either side is insufficient without the other.
 The first part of this paper discusses how Aquinas can simultaneously 
hold that the soul as form is not a group of powers while also holding that 
the soul as mover or potential whole is composed of powers. The second 
part discusses why he would disagree with Johnston’s arguments that 
the soul cannot be a group of powers, and the third part discusses why 
he would disagree with arguments that the soul is nothing but a group 
of powers. The fourth part explains in what sense he agrees with both 
sides and why he thinks that both perspectives are necessary to give a 
full account of what soul is.
i
Six times (by my count), Aristotle himself raises the question of whether 
the soul is composed of parts, and if so, how the soul has parts. For 
example,
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We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and 
whether it is everywhere homogenous or not; and if not homogenous, 
whether its various forms are different specifically or generically. . . . 
Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls but a plurality of 
parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul 
or its parts? It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these 
parts are in nature distinct from one another. Again, which ought we 
to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, 
the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on?2
In this passage, Aristotle asks whether the soul is divisible into parts 
and, if it is divisible, whether these parts are perhaps different souls. 
Aristotle has thus left a few options on the table: there may be many 
souls, there may be many parts in one soul, or perhaps there are no 
parts at all.
 Let us take the first of these off the table for Aquinas, namely, the pos-
sibility that there are many souls or substantial forms in one composite. 
Aquinas, unlike almost everyone else of his time, argues that there is only 
one substantial form in any substance. For Aquinas, substantial form 
is what makes a being actually exist and grants it its substantial unity, 
and it is also what makes a substance be a particular kind of substance. 
Furthermore, substantial form, which is act, directly informs prime 
matter, which is pure potency. Accidental forms, in contrast, inhere in 
and qualify substances in some particular way, for example, whiteness 
inheres in this substance and thus makes it white.
 Aquinas criticizes those who posit a multiplicity of substantial forms 
along two main lines. First, he holds that they are confusing the accidental 
and substantial orders, since, whenever one form comes to another, one 
of them must be a substantial form and the other must be an accidental 
form that inheres in a substance. For example, there cannot be one form 
of rationality and another of animality that come together to make a 
rational animal, since one of these forms must inhere in the other—thus, 
one must be the substance, and the other an accident. If there were two 
such forms, then either I would be essentially animal and accidentally 
rational, or I would be essentially rational and accidentally animal; but 
(following Aristotle) I am essentially a rational animal. Aquinas’s second 
line of criticism follows the first. He asks: If a substance is composed of two 
substantial forms, what accounts for the two forms being one substance? 
How do we account for the substantial unity that holds the entire being 
together? To put it simply, if there are two substantial forms, how can we 
explain that it is one substance rather than two? Aquinas thinks there 
is no answer to this question. There can only be one substantial form; 
anything else predicated of a substance, if it is a really distinct form, must 
be an accident that inheres in that substance.3
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 But Aristotle left two other possibilities on the table: either there 
are parts to the soul, or there are no parts to the soul. Aquinas argues 
that both of these are in a certain sense correct. Let us first consider 
his reasoning for not positing parts to the soul. For Aquinas, because 
the soul directly and immediately informs matter,4 there is no way to 
divide it into parts. The soul equally informs the whole body and each 
part; for example, there is not more soul in my eye than in my intestine, 
since these are equal with respect to the soul’s precise role of informing 
matter (QDA 10[Leon.24/1.90.147–50:178–82]). If, however, the soul were 
only the form of a part or the form of some parts of the body, it would 
not be the form of the whole body but only of that part or of those parts 
of the body (ibid.). Qua form of the body or matter, the soul is unified 
and simplex,5 as Aquinas puts it. If the soul is to be defined solely as the 
form of the body, then there is no reason to divide the soul into parts.
 There is, however, another sense in which the soul does have parts. 
What distinguishes animate from inanimate substantial form is precisely 
life, which is characterized as a nature that has its own source of motion 
(Physics II)—specifically, nature is that which moves itself (In De an. 
2.1.Leon.45.1.70.177–78; compare Aristotle, De Anima 412b16–17). In 
other words, things with soul move themselves, while things without 
soul do not. This is why, according to Aquinas, Aristotle includes life in 
his definition of soul: “[T]he soul is an actuality of the first kind of a 
natural body having life potentially in it” (De Anima 412a27–30). Self-
motion requires dividing the soul into parts, for when one says that the 
soul moves itself, there is a distinction between the soul that moves and 
the soul that is moved (“itself”). Since this obviously refers to the same 
soul, Aquinas infers that this distinction between moving and being 
moved must refer to different parts within the same soul.6
 Aquinas bases his inference that these must be different parts on Ar-
istotle’s arguments in Physics VIII concerning the axiom that everything 
that is moved is moved by another. If the axiom is true, then the possibility 
of self-motion must be rejected, for if something moves itself, then it is 
not moved by another. But Aquinas and Aristotle are careful to point out 
that they are not denying the kind of self-motion established in Physics 
II, that is, the self-motion of nature as that which can move itself.
 Aquinas’s argument assumes the general division of being into act 
and potency and takes its starting point from motion, which is the act 
of potency as potency. Granting this, it follows that nothing can reduce 
itself from potency to act, since then it would simultaneously be in act 
and in potency in the same way and at the same time, that is, it would 
both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect, which is 
a contradiction. Thus, everything that is moved (reduced from potency 
to act) is moved by another (which is actual). Since we cannot regress 
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to infinity in per se ordered causes, we must come to some cause that is 
not moved by another.7
 This cause that is not moved by another is moved by itself; it is moved 
per se in the strongest sense.8 This kind of per se causality is only intel-
ligible as the negation of per accidens motion (In VIII Phys.7.535.1022), 
and because we cannot help but think of such a cause as reducing itself 
from potency to act, it is, in a certain sense, unintelligible to us. As is well 
known, Aquinas argues that there can only be one such cause, namely, 
God; he reasons to a God who is perfect and completely actual without 
any potency. On Aquinas’s view, God’s actions involve no reduction from 
potency to act and, thus, are not, strictly speaking, motions.9
 In contrast to this kind of self-motion, when any finite being moves 
itself, because it is composed of act and potency, it moves itself by means 
of parts; that is, one part is actual, and it reduces to act some other part 
that is in potency. Strictly speaking, this kind of self-motion is per acci-
dens in the particular sense of a motion that can only happen by means 
of its part.10 Thus, the axiom that everything that moves is moved by 
another also applies, as both Aquinas and Aristotle insist, to the parts 
within a natural self-mover (In VIII Phys.10.553.1051; Aristotle, Phys-
ics 258a23–25). Regardless of what kind of self-motion is meant—for 
example, nutritive, sensitive, or rational—in none of these possible cases 
does the first cause of motion come completely from the agent.11
 This is why any soul, as it is a principle of motion, must be composed 
of parts.12 Aquinas thus distinguishes between two different causal roles 
of the soul, namely, the soul as form (forma) and the soul as mover (mo-
tor). As the form of the body, the soul has no parts (it is simplex), but 
as mover, that is, as the principle of motion or operation, it does have 
parts (it is multiplex). This division of the soul into parts, Aquinas says, 
is according to operation (secundum operari).13
 Both Aristotle and Aquinas are very explicit that these parts of the 
soul are its powers.14 Aquinas says that they are parts of a potential 
whole and that the powers of the soul are its potential parts.15 The soul, 
according to Aquinas, is a certain potential whole (anima enim est quod-
dam totum potenciale), and he even goes so far as claiming that this 
is also Aristotle’s personal position (In I de an.14.Leon.45/1.65.63–75; 
QDA 10 ad 9).
 Be that as it may, for Aquinas the potential whole is a whole of power, 
that is, a kind of sum total of what the soul can do, its total power (totalis 
virtutis eius), in the sense in which it might be said that the power of the 
bailiff is part of the total power of the royal court.16 The soul as a poten-
tial whole is the soul considered as it has various powers that operate in 
unison to perform highly complex operations in an integrated manner. 
s__
n__
lc
HPQ 34_2 text.indd   118 6/29/17   11:15 AM
 AQUINAS AND ARISTOTELIANS AND THE SOUL 119
Each power plays its proper role in the power of the creature as a whole. 
In a late passage in his commentary on Aristotle’s De sensu (1268–70), 
Aquinas gives a clear account of this; note the hierarchy, order, and mutu-
ally exclusive but complementary operative roles of the soul’s parts:
[W]herever there are diverse ordered powers, the inferior power is 
related to the superior power in the manner of an instrument because 
the superior moves the inferior. For action is attributed to the principal 
agent through the instrument, as we say that the builder cuts with 
the saw. It is in this way that Aristotle says here that the common 
sense senses through sight and hearing and the other proper senses, 
which are diverse potential parts of the soul (Sentencia libri De sensu 
1.18.Leon.45/1.89.130–40).
 Nature or life understood as ordered and acting for the sake of an end, 
but not immediately operative, must be composed of a such a complicated 
ordered group of really distinct powers. It is this ordered hierarchy of 
material and immaterial powers, ordered in the sense of operating in 
unison, with each power playing its part for the sake of the person’s end, 
that Aquinas calls the “potential whole.”17
 It is worth noting that, in the particular case of the powers or parts 
of the potential whole, which are accidents, the subject not only serves 
as the receiving principle in which they inhere (this is common to all 
accidents), but the subject is also included in the definition of the ac-
cident as its active and efficient cause.18 Because there must be some 
likeness between cause and effect, in this case, the soul and its powers, 
we can learn something of a person’s soul from his accidental powers, 
for example, that he is rational, which signifies that this kind of soul 
always produces and has rational powers. That is how Aquinas explains 
Aristotle’s claim (De anima 1.1.402b21–403a2) that we have knowledge 
of the soul through its properties or powers and that there is no real 
definition of the soul without its properties or powers.19
 Thus, there are two ways of understanding what the soul is. As the 
form of the body (or the essentia animae) and the principle of substance, 
the powers of the soul are excluded from our understanding of the soul. 
But as the soul is a mover or potential whole, however, the powers of the 
soul are included in our understanding of soul. But it is the same soul 
that is a principle in two different ways, that is, as the formal principle 
of material substance and as the principle of powers and operations.20
ii
Let us now consider Rebekah Johnston’s arguments that that the soul 
cannot be composed of parts. Johnston has three main arguments. First, 
she argues that, because the soul is a form (De anima 412a20–21) and 
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form is actual and not potential (Metaphysics 1043a25–28), granting that 
powers as potentialities are potential, the soul cannot be a group of powers 
without making the soul a potential existent (Johnston 2011, 191–92).
 Johnston suggests that the term “first actuality,” which Aristotle of-
ten uses to describe the soul as it is actual, is not defined in terms of a 
further actualization (2011, 190), but Aquinas would strongly disagree 
with her on that point. The term “first actuality” is precisely related to a 
“second actuality” (ST I 76.4 ad 1), for, otherwise, one would just use the 
term “actuality” rather than “first actuality.” The whole point of Aristotle’s 
example of knowledge as a first actuality is that knowledge is actually 
possessed, but it is precisely the kind of thing that is also in potency to a 
further secondary actualization, namely, knowing.21 Thus, if the soul is a 
first actuality that is in potency to a second actuality, the powers of the soul 
must somehow be included in soul. Once Aquinas’s distinction between 
the soul as form and as mover is made, the soul can be classified among 
both potential and actual existents.22 As the form of the body, it is actual 
as actualizing body; as a potential whole, however, it is considered as it 
is in potency to its further actualization through its parts or powers.23 
The latter presupposes the former, of course, but there is no metaphysical 
inconsistency once one grasps the two different senses of soul.
 Second, Johnston points out that, in Metaphysics 9 (1046a21–28 and 
a36–b4), Aristotle argues that powers are in a subject, and she asks: 
What is this subject? There are three possibilities: the soul, the body, 
or the composite of soul and body. If the powers are the soul, however, 
then they cannot be in themselves. Nor can they be in the body because 
the soul is precisely what makes body be body; nor can they be in the 
composite, since the composite presupposes soul. Since there is appar-
ently no subject for the soul as a set of powers to be in, the soul cannot 
be a set of powers (Johnston 2011, 193).
 Qua form, for Aquinas, the soul is in the category substance, and 
the powers of the soul are in the category of quality.24 The powers of 
the soul are accidents that inhere in the soul itself and, in some cases, 
in the composite (ST I. 77.6). In this sense, the powers of the soul are 
not the soul itself (essentia animae); rather, the soul is their subject. As 
the soul is a mover, however, the powers of the soul are included in the 
definition of the soul. Thus, we may affirm Johnston’s argument that 
the soul qua form is actual and cannot be a set of powers, but we may 
reject it as the soul is a mover.25
 As her third argument, Johnston points out that the soul is in the 
category substance and substance is first in ratio in the categories.26 
However, if the soul is a set of potencies, they are necessarily posterior 
in ratio to their second acts, which themselves are in a different category 
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(action; Categories 4, 2a3). In other words, if the soul is set of potencies, 
then, claims Johnston, this undermines the argument for the primacy 
of substance as the first category (Johnston 2011, 193).
 Following Aristotle, when Aquinas divides being between substance 
and accidents, he is dividing being into beings that are their own centers 
of existence and those that only exist in other substances. This is why the 
prime referent of being in the categorical schema is always substance, 
since substance is always in the definition of an accident as the cause 
of that accident’s being.27 As the substantial form of the body, the soul 
performs the role of granting and causing substantial being and unity, 
informing the body, and serving as the subject or supposite for accidents.
 This is one kind of metaphysical or categorical primacy; however, 
teleological primacy, which is quite different, does not undermine this. 
When the soul is understood as composed of powers, it is true that the 
second act or operation has primacy, since the second act is primary in 
the sense that it is the final cause (In I de an.1.Leon.45/1.71.303–5). 
In general, the final cause, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is the 
causa causarum. The claim, however, that the final cause is the most 
important of the four causes is not a metaphysical claim about the 
kind of being at stake. The metaphysical primacy of substance in the 
categorical schemata is not threatened by the fact that that substance 
is not primary in every way. Simply because a substance is the kind of 
thing that is teleologically ordered to some particular action, it does not 
follow that action must have the same kind of metaphysical gravitas as 
substance. In sum, Aquinas would grant Johnston’s three arguments in 
terms of the soul as form, but not in terms of the soul as mover.
iii
Most contemporary Aristotelians, however, hold that the soul is nothing 
but a holistically unified cluster of powers.28 For example, Anna Mar-
modoro argues that substances are functional wholes, comprising parts 
that are, however, reidentified when they become parts of a substance. 
By this, she means that when something “enters” into the constitution 
of a substance, it does not retain the same identity it had when it was 
not part of the substance; rather, it is reidentified as a functional part 
of the substance it now constitutes. The characteristic operation or 
function of the substance as a whole drives the reidentification of its 
constituents. Marmodoro states, “Substantial form according to Aris-
totle is an operation on the elements of a substance, stripping them of 
their distinctness, rather than being an item in the ontology,” and “[a] 
substance is all its parts, re-identified” (2013, 18). What are these parts? 
For Marmodoro, they are the active and passive causal powers, which 
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are relative (Metaphysics, 1020b26–32), that is, pros ti (towards some-
thing) monadic properties. Active powers are relative to passive powers, 
and passive powers are relative to active powers, these causal relata 
are ontologically interdependent as mover and moved, and causation 
consists in the mutual activation of both powers. On this reading, the 
soul is a kind of causal functional unification of a highly sophisticated 
complex of active and passive powers, a kind of division of labor working 
together holistically in a metaphysically seamless way (Marmodoro 2014, 
Chapter 1). In Aquinas’s terms, substantial form on this understanding 
is merely the potential whole or mover.
 Thomas Johansen, who holds a similar position, asks the following 
question:
The soul itself is supposed to be a substance, but we are now saying 
that it is itself composed of capacities for change which seem not all 
at least to belong to the same categories. That is to say, categorically 
different items enter into the essence of the soul. Does the soul not 
end up as a categorical hodgepodge of entities? (2012, 81)
Johansen’s ultimate answer is affirmative. Each kind of soul is a group 
of powers unified and related to each other as form to matter, that is, 
as act to potency (ibid., Chapter 3). In other words, for Johansen, the 
soul is all powers, a functionally organized categorical hodgepodge. 
Furthermore, for both Johansen and Marmodoro, the body itself qua 
matter is also made up of powers (Marmodoro 2013, 12–18; Johansen 
2012, Chapter 1). As Marmodoro puts it, “[T]he ultimate level of reality 
is the fundamental powers (hot, cold, wet and dry)” (2013, 11–12). Thus, 
hylomorphism, the relation between matter and form as potency and 
act, is, on their understanding, ultimately reducible to the clustering of 
interrelated powers along the lines of act and potency.
 From a strict Aristotelian perspective, one wonders how these authors 
would respond to Johnston’s unanswered objections, which have strong 
textual support. As of yet, there has been no response. Aquinas himself 
would argue against them on more philosophical grounds within a 
broadly Aristotelian framework. For him, the powers of hot, cold, wet, and 
dry are the powers of the most basic substances, the elements,29 which 
cause those powers. Because powers presuppose substantial forms as 
their cause, one cannot argue that these powers somehow cause or are the 
substantial form itself. This is why there aren’t free-floating powers that 
cluster into this substance and then cluster into that substance. Even if 
there were, however, one would still have to explain how they clustered 
into this substance rather than that one. In other words, if the powers 
of one substance are to become the powers of another substance through 
being reidentified, there must be something else beyond the powers that 
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accounts for this new reidentification and clustering, namely, substantial 
form. Appealing to a substance’s operations to account for this clustering 
must fall short because one must ask how they so clustered to be able 
to so operate in the first place. In other words, there must be something 
of a higher ontological type, namely, substantial form, that causes and 
unifies the powers.30
 Nor can matter be composed of powers. In the illustrative case of 
substantial change at the elemental level, for example, fire turning into 
air, there must be some other more elemental potency principle under-
lying substantial generation, namely, prime matter.31 In other cases of 
generation, it seems that one can appeal to another more fundamental 
potency principle out of which some substance might come to be (for 
example, bronze or earth), but in the case of the substantial generation 
of elements, there is simply nothing more fundamental to appeal to than 
the elements themselves. Following Aristotle’s response to Parmenides, 
Aquinas concedes that something cannot come from nothing. He divides 
being into act and potency, and, in the case of substantial generation, 
Aquinas argues that the potency principle in substantial generation is 
not powers (whose existence presuppose that substantial generation 
has already taken place), but rather, relative nonbeing or prime matter, 
which is not pure nothingness but rather pure potency.32
 On Aquinas’s reading of substantial generation, the old substance 
and its powers are destroyed, and a completely new one and its powers 
come to be.33 If the potency principle in substantial generation were to 
be any other form already enmattered (sperm, menstrual fluid, elements, 
powers, or whatever), then one would have two or more substantial 
forms in a composite,34 and one would be forced back to the question of 
substantial unity, which we have already discussed.
 Aquinas does place the active and passive powers in the category 
relation, but they are also in the category of quality. A power can be 
considered a quality insofar as it has inesse (existing in) and as a rela-
tion insofar as it has adesse (that is, existing toward, Aristotle’s pros 
ti), but it is exactly the same accident that can be considered from both 
perspectives.35 Marmodoro (2013, 2014), however, only describes powers 
as existing toward rather than existing in because of her commitment to 
what she calls a “pure powers” ontology, that is, a purely dispositionalist 
and noncategorical account of powers.
 For readers less familiar with the contemporary analytical distinction 
between categorical and dispositional properties, the term “categorical” 
does not refer back to Aristotle’s Categories, but rather means categori-
cal as opposed to hypothetical. Thus, a categorical property is a property 
that the subject actually has, and a dispositional property is one that the 
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subject has in potentiality. For instance, to say that a diamond has the 
power to scratch glass is not to say anything about an actual categori-
cal quality or property of the diamond itself; rather, it is a dispositional 
description signifying that a diamond can potentially scratch glass if (or 
on the condition or hypothesis that) it is raked across the surface of glass.
 I think the way forward along lines that are more congruent with 
Aquinas’s thought is the “identity theory of powers” advocated by C. B. 
Martin, John Heil, and William Jaworski.36 This theory argues that one 
and the same property has both categorical and dispositional descriptions 
and theoretical roles; that is, the same power can be described both as an 
actuality and as a potentiality, but in different respects. Thus, humans 
actually have the power of sight, but it is not actual when our eyes are 
closed. We can describe the categorical actuality of that power in one way, 
as inhering in the person or as the structural-material makeup of its 
organ, the eye, but the very same power is in potency to being actualized 
or not, that is, to seeing or not seeing. In the latter sense, we are speaking 
of the causal-dispositional role of that very same categorical property. We 
can distinguish between categorical and dispositional facets, between its 
actuality and potentiality, but it is the same actual power that is in potency 
to a further actualization simply because it is that kind of a thing. That 
is, it is precisely because a diamond is actually or categorically hard that 
it has the dispositional power to scratch glass.
 For Aquinas, the ontological unity of the soul’s parts is only truly 
grasped insofar as the parts are qualities and have inesse and not insofar 
as they are relatives and have adesse. Aquinas flatly denies that there is 
any reason to posit ontological unity between dispositional descriptions 
of movers and moved.37 Sometimes movers and moved, active and pas-
sive powers, are in the same substance, but obviously sometimes they 
are not. Consider, for example, the external senses. On the one hand, 
we may consider them as powers of the soul in the sense in which they 
actually inhere in this substance. On the other hand, we may consider 
them as they are related to and moved by external sensible qualities. 
The later dispositional description will not help us ground the unity of 
the soul’s parts, but the former categorical one will. Substantial form, 
thus, is an “element in ontology” that unifies the soul’s powers by caus-
ing them and by causing the substance in which they inhere.38 Without 
this perspective, it is impossible to argue for substantial unity or the 
metaphysical primacy of substance in Aristotle’s categorical schema.
iv
Explanations of soul that lean heavily on powers and their operations 
have difficulty accounting for substantial unity; those leaning heav-
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ily on such substantial unity have difficulty accounting for the soul’s 
manifold operations. Grasped as form, the soul is the principle of sub-
stance, subsisting, and its unity. But, for Aquinas, it also is axiomatic 
that esse is proportioned to operari, that is, substantial existence is for 
the sake of action, or, in even simpler words, this substance exists in 
this particular way so that it can act in this way.39 In this respect, the 
soul cannot simply be described as a substantial form but must also be 
described as a mover or potential whole. This is why one of the crucial 
roles of substantial form is causing its various powers (which inhere in 
that substance) and acting through these powers. Qua form, we need 
not consider the powers of the soul, for we are focused on how soul is the 
principle of material substances. Qua mover, we are rather focused on 
how this same unified living substance acts, and, from this perspective, 
our understanding of soul must also include its parts or powers. But we 
may consider soul in two senses, either without powers as it is the form 
or the body and the principle of substantial unity, or as the soul causes 
its powers and operates through its powers: but Aquinas insists that, 
ultimately, it is the same soul that can be considered as the principle of 
these two different effects, namely, substance and operation.
 According to Aquinas’s view of the history of philosophy, Plato (like 
Marmodoro and Johansen) simply grasped the soul as mover and not 
as an Aristotelian formal cause.40 But Aquinas nevertheless thinks that 
Plato was half right, and Aquinas would undoubtedly agree with many 
of Marmodoro’s and Johansen’s formulations about the extraordinarily 
sophisticated holistic complex of the powers of the soul. Likewise, he 
would agree with Johnston’s reasons for excluding powers when con-
sidering soul as the formal principle of substance.
 Concerning the contemporary aporia among Aristotelians vis-à-vis the 
soul and its parts, both sides build compelling arguments on particular sets 
of texts supporting their opposing views. It seems that either Aristotle is 
inconsistent or that the aporia requires a resolution that looks something 
like Aquinas’s. Although most Aristotelians will be skeptical of Aquinas’s 
claim that this was Aristotle’s own solution, nevertheless, no one doubts 
Aquinas as a serious reader of Aristotle, and nothing in Aquinas’s solu-
tion is anathema to Aristotelian thought in general, although some will 
inevitably object to this or that. Be that as it may, Aquinas’s neglected 
solution is undoubtedly of historical interest, and granting the increasing 
interest in hylomorphism, I think it should also merit a hearing in its 
own right as one possible and plausible philosophical position.41
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NOTES
1. For more literature, see n28 below.
2. Aristotle, De Anima 1.1.402b1–13, 641–2; cf. ibid., 1.5.411a26–b31, 
655–56; 2.2.413b14–414a4, 658–59; III.9.432a15–b9; Nichomachean Ethics 
1.13.1102a26–32 and 1102b24–5.
3. For Aquinas’s best texts on the unicity of substantial form, see his QSC 
(Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis) 3; QDA (Quaestiones disputatae 
de anima) 9; SCG (Summa Contra Gentiles) 2.71; ST I 76, a. 3, 4, 6, 7. See Dales 
(1995); Pegis (1934); Wippel (2000, 327–51).
4. QDA 11 (Leon.24/1.100.250–52); In De an. 2.1 (Sentencia libri De anima) 
(Leon.45/1.72–73.368–89); QSC 3 (Leon.24/2.38–39.224–48). See White (1996).
5. QDA 9 ad 14 (Leon.24/1.85.483); ibid., 8 ad 14 (Leon.24/1.73.459–63); 
ibid., 10 ad 17 (Leon.24/1.94.401), for example.
6. In VIII Physic. c.10 (In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, Mari-
etti.553.1053): “Si igitur totum moveat se secundum totum, sequitur quod idem 
sit simul actu et potentia; quod est impossibile. Ex hoc ergo concludit principale 
intentum, quod moventis seipsum una pars movet et alia movetur.”
7. For a presentation and discussion of these kinds arguments and their 
critics from a general metaphysical perspective, see Wippel (2000, 413–25 and 
444–62). On the specific question of the impossibility of an infinite regress in 
per se causes, see Wippel (2000, 422–23, esp. n63) and Cohoe (2013).
8. For Aquinas, per se motion is a somewhat flexible term. Per se motion in 
the strongest sense is the sense in which a whole moves itself as whole, which 
is only applicable to God. But there is another kind of per se motion: this is mo-
tion in the sense in which an action is proper to a specific nature. For example, 
reasoning and willing are proper per se actions of the human being; see In 
VII Phys.c.7.7 (Marietti.535.1023). A related but different sense is involved in 
Aquinas’s claim that per se actions only come from beings that per se subsist; 
see SCG II.51 (Leon.manualis.144). Here he has in mind an immaterial mode 
of existing and its consequent actions.
9. In Sent. (Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombar-
di)1.8.3.1–2. See also ST I 9.1–2 and SCG 1.13 and ST I 2.3.
10. See n6 above.
11. In Aristotle, it sometimes appears that one part of the soul is an un-
moved mover, but Aquinas argues against this (when it is taken too strictly) on 
the grounds that, if the causal chain indeed truly stopped there, such a part of 
the soul would have to be God (pure act, not moved by another). For Aquinas, 
if one follows the various parts of the soul backward in the causal chain, the 
only serious candidate for this role is the will, which, Aquinas argues (using a 
passage from Aristotle’s Eudamian Ethics), is ultimately moved instinctually by 
God (see QDM [Quaestiones disputatae de malo] 6 [Leon.23.149.407–17]). For 
a recent interpretation and discussion of the Aristotelian scholarship on this 
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passage in the Eudemian Ethics, see Gabbe (2012). For Aquinas’s use of this 
text, see Hoffmann (2007) and Shanley (1998). On the conflict between God’s 
motion and evil human choice, see Grant (2009). For Aquinas on the starting 
point of motion in the nutritive/vegetative powers, see, for example, QDA 9 and 
ibid., ad 6; ibid., 10 ad 4, 5. The origin of the motion of the sensitive powers is 
more complex, since there can be several different and sometimes simultaneous 
sources, for example, sense cognition, the heavenly bodies, reason, and will; but 
in none of the possible sources of sensitive motion does the soul move itself as 
a whole.
12. For the full argument, see In VII Phys.c.7 (Marietti.535.1022; 
ibid., 537.1028); In VIII Physic.c.10 (Marietti.553.1051–53); In I De an.c.6 
(Leon.45/1.28.57–94); In II De an.c.1 (Leon.45/1.73.380–92). For Aquinas’s other 
arguments, see Wippel (2000, 285–88). I am intentionally ignoring the argu-
ment in QDA 12 because I’m not fully persuaded that it works. King (2008, 265) 
characterizes this as Aquinas’s best argument, but I will simply note that King 
missed this argument from the broad concept of motion—Aquinas’s strongest 
argument for the necessity of positing powers of the soul—which is rooted in 
his basic metaphysics of act and potency. For another reply to King’s paper, see 
Wood (2011).
13. QDA.9.ad14 (Leon.24/1.85.483–92): “anima sit forma simplex secun-
dum essentiam, est tamen multiplex uirtute secundum quod est principium 
diversarum operationum. . . . oportet esse ordinem in partibus secundum 
ordinem operationem.” Cf. In I de an. 1 (Leon.45/1.73.387–92); QDA 8, ad 14 
(Leon.45/1.73.459–63); QDA.9 (Leon.24/1.81.246–56); ST I 76.5 ad 3; etc. It 
should be noted that, for Aquinas, these are not the only two causal roles that 
the soul plays. It is also a principle of subsisting, which is not reducible to the 
other two roles; see SCG II, c. 51, for a good summary of what it means for a 
form to subsist.
14. Aristotle, De Anima, 413b27–32. For a description of Aquinas’s powers, 
see ST I, qq. 78–82.
15. Although the term “potential whole” seems to have come from Boethius, 
Aquinas was undoubtedly also influenced by his teacher Albert the Great. See 
Albert, De IV coaequaevis, IV.36.2, part.1, sol. Borgnet v. 34, 540. See Boethius 
(1998, PL 64:888, 38–41) and Magee’s comments on 144–46. For a discussion 
of Boethius’s text, see Arlig (2006) and Hasse (20082). For Aquinas’s division 
of wholes and parts, see QSC 4 and 11 ad 2; QDA 10; ST I 76.8 and 77.1 ad 1. 
See also Svoboda (2012).
16. QSC a.11 ad 19 (Leon.24/2.123.462–65); cf. In I de an. 14 (Leon.45/1.65.64–
68).
17. QDA 13 ad 7 (Leon.24/1.121.407–14). QDA.9 (Leon.24/1.82.283–98); In 
de an. 1.14 (Leon.45/1.67–69); QDA 13 ad. 9 (Leon.24/1.121.426–31); QSC 11.ad 
2 (Leon.24/2.120.326–29); QDA 10 (Leon.24/1.91–92.249–52): ST 77.4.
18. Super Boetium De Trinitate (de trin.) 5.4 ad 4 (Leon.50.156.277–86). For 
Aquinas, there is a necessary causal connection between the soul and its powers 
or properties, for the powers of the soul have a permanent cause in their subject, 
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QDA.12 ad 7 (Leon.24/1.111.265–87); that is, they are always being caused by 
soul or substantial form. This guarantees that, as long as the subject exists, 
the powers do so as well. That is why they are said to be inseparable from the 
subject, and it is this necessary causal relation that allows Aquinas to predicate 
the powers of the soul. Perler (2015, 128) denies that the soul efficiently causes 
its powers, and some, for example, Pasnau (2002, 152, 167, passim), think that 
the soul causing its powers is mysterious. But for contemporary philosophers 
who grant the existence of form (structure, organization, arrangement, order, 
or configuration; see Jaworski [2016, Chapter 14] for a discussion of the vari-
ous extant positions), many also believe that these structures are responsible 
for certain organized parts, for example, the eye, brain, or heart. For instance, 
Jaworski himself argues that 
composition happens only when a structured individual configures the ma-
terials that compose it, and I am the only individual located exactly where I 
am that is engaged in that configuring activity. It is true that located exactly 
where I am there are also numerous biofunctional parts such as my heart, 
brain, and kidneys, but the existence of these parts depends on my own 
existence. (2016, 330)
For Aquinas, this form or structure is always actualizing or efficiently causing 
these parts or powers, and Aquinas uses the term “flowing” (because he inherited 
it from Albert the Great) to describe this causal phenomenon. If this is a real 
problem for Aquinas, then any philosopher (and there are many) who holds that 
form, structure, configuration, and such somehow cause its parts has the same 
problem. For Aquinas’s views on how we can predicate the powers of the soul, 
see In I post.an.14 (Leon.1/2.53–54.14–46); QDV (Quaestiones disputatae de veri-
tate) 10.1(Leon.22.1.296–97.107–11); and cf. Aristotle’s On The Heavens, I, c.11, 
281a7–15. For the Aristotelian provenance of this way of thinking, see De anima 
I.402b22–25, and Aquinas comments at QDV 10.1(Leon.22.1.296–97.107–11); 
ST I.77.1.ad7; ST I, 85.1. Note that the different souls, that is, intellective, 
sensitive and nutritive are clusters of powers of the potential whole named 
from the highest powers; see ST II-II.48.1; In I de an.1 (Leon.45/1.7.231–46); 
QDA.19.ad 5 (Leon24/1.166.259–71); Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, 3.11, 
ad 2 (Marietti, 75); ibid., 3.11, ad 2 (Marietti, 75)—this is how Aquinas interprets 
Aristotle’s obscure remarks (De anima 414b28–31) about different souls being 
include within each other as geometrical forms.
19. In I de an. 1(Leon.45/1.7.250–60:268–74). Cf. In I de an. 9 (Leon.45/1.44–
5.82–89); In I de an.11(Leon.45/1.56.197–200).
20. QSC 3 ad. 7(Leon.24/2.45.500–502): “ sicut enim eadem est secun-
dum substantiam anima, que est motor et forma, set differt ratione.” QDA.9 
(Leon.24/1.81.246–56); QDA.9 ad 2(Leon.24/1.83.324–30). For a fuller treatment 
of Aquinas’s thinking on the potential whole, see Chapters 1–4 of my forthcom-
ing book (2018) with The Catholic University of America Press.
21. Aquinas says that the example of knowledge differs from the soul be-
cause, although habitual knowledge is the immediate principle of knowing, the 
soul cannot be the immediate principle of operation but rather must operate by 
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means of its parts or powers. QDA 12 ad 14(Leon.24/1.111–12.316–20); QDA 
9(Leon.24/1.81.246–50).
22. ST III. 75.6 ad 2: “anima est forma”; and ST I. 75.5: “forma, inquantum 
forma, est actus”; however, in ST I–II. 2.7: “Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, 
est ut in potentia existens.”
23. ST I. 77.1; In libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo expositio 2.4(Leon.3.136); 
SCG II. 60; etc. Concerning Aristotle’s example of habitual knowledge, see ST 
I–II. 49.3 ad 1. Note. In II de an. 1(Leon.45/1.71.315–19).
24. Aquinas puts the powers of the soul in the second species of quality: QSC 
II(Leon.24/2.119.257–58). For Aquinas’s views on quality, see Kahm (2016).
25. ST I–II. 55.4; ST I. 77.1 ad 4; QDM 4.4 ad 3 (Leon.23.117.135–43).
26. Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36–b2, and 9.8, 1049b13–17.
27. For Aristotle on substance as the prime referent, see Physics, 1003b5–19; 
for Aquinas, see In IV Meta. 1 (In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis 
expositio) (Marietti.152–53.539–47).
28. For some earlier arguments that the soul is a group of powers see Ackrill 
(1972–73); Charlton (1980); Sorabji (1993, 163–64). Sorabji argues that, because 
Aristotle describes knowledge as both a first actuality (412a10) and a second 
potentiality (417a21–b2), we may infer that the soul is also both a first actual-
ity and a second potentiality. But then Sorabji goes further and argues that, 
because Aristotle expresses dissatisfaction with the definition of the soul as an 
actuality, saying that the definition is merely a “sketch or outline” (413a10), 
he simply replaces it with a better definition, namely, that the soul is a set of 
potencies (163–64). But Aquinas thinks that, at that point in De Anima II, Ar-
istotle had already sufficiently proved that the soul is a first actuality that has 
life in it potentially. See Cap. 1 of Aquinas’s In II De anima. (Leon.45/1.67–73). 
Aquinas takes this supposed “sketchiness” simply to mean that it is generic. It 
tells us much about the soul, but there are more specific definitions of particular 
kinds of souls that must be filled out if we wish to know more about, say, quid 
sit anima hominis: In II de an.6(Leon.45/1.91.12–21). See also Corcilius and 
Gregoric (2010), who only discuss how the parts are related to each other.
29. QDA 12 (Leon.24/1.109.164–70); See also ibid., q. 1 (Leon.24/1.9.296–99).
30. I agree with Scaltsas that something of a different ontological type is 
needed to account for the unity of these parts. Cf. Scaltsas (1990, 587–88).
31. For a good discussion of this, see Aquinas’s De principiis naturae 
(Leon.43.41.70–89), esp. lines 85–89: For a full discussion including all the im-
portant texts, see Wippel (2000, 295–371). For a helpful general argument for 
the existence of prime matter, see Jaeger (2014); see also Feser (2014, 160–208).
32. Aristotle is quite clear that powers cannot be matter; see Metaphysics, 
1029a20–22, where he states that matter is “neither a particular thing nor of 
a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is 
determined.” See also Aquinas’s In VII Meta. 7.2 (Marietti.233.1285)—that is, 
matter is not reducible to the active and passive powers considered as relations 
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or qualities. For some other important passages for Aquinas on prime matter, 
see Aristotle’s Physics, 190b1–4 and 191a3–12.
33. For example, see Aquinas’s QDA 9 and QSC 3.
34. On sperm and menstrual fluid, see QDP 3.9 ad 9 and ad 11. For Aquinas, 
the elements remain virtually (in virtute) in the power of the substance; see De 
mixtione elementorum (Leon.43.155–57); de trin., 4.3, ad 6; Quodlib. 1.4.1 ad 
3; ST I.76.4, ad 4; QDA 9, ad 10. All of this is to say that the prior substantial 
forms of the elements do not remain actually present in substances.
35. ST I.28.2. For a discussion and more texts, see Henninger (1987).
36. Heil (2003); Jaworski (2014), (2016); Martin (2007); Martin and Heil 
(1999).
37. QDA 9 ad 3 (Leon.24/1.83.331–32): “ex motore ex mobili non fit unum 
per se in quantum huismodi.”; QDA 11(Leon.24/1.99.171–73); SCG.II.56 (Leon.
manualis.151).
38. This is why Aquinas’s philosophical arguments about the soul’s parts al-
ways come after he has established that there can only be one substantial form in 
any substance and that this substantial form immediately informs prime matter 
and nothing else; thus, QSC 3 is presupposed for QSC 4; QDA 9 is presupposed 
for QDA 10; and ST I.76, aa.1, 3, 4, 6, and 7 are presupposed for ST I.76, a.8.
39. To put it most simply, QDV 9 (Marietti, 731): “omnis res est prop-
ter suam operationem.” See also QDA 10, ad 2 (Leon.24/1.92.287–89); 
QDA 9 (Leon.24/1.82.278–80); QDA.9 (Leon.24/1.81.256–82); QDA 9 ad. 14 
(Leon.24/1.85.482–94).
40. In II de an. 2 (Leon.45/1.76.153–57); ST I.76.3; ST I.76.7; QDA 11.
41. I wish to thank John Wippel and Anna Marmodoro for reading and 
commenting on earlier versions of this paper.
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